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ABSTRACT 
 
Competition, Hidden Information and Efficiency: An Experiment 
 
We devise an experiment to explore the effect of different degrees of competition on optimal 
contracts in a hidden-information context. In our benchmark case, each principal is matched 
with one agent of unknown type. In our second treatment, a principal can select one of three 
agents, while in a third treatment an agent may choose between the contract menus offered 
by two principals. We first show theoretically how these different degrees of competition 
affect outcomes and efficiency. Informational asymmetries generate inefficiency. In an 
environment where principals compete against each other to hire agents, these inefficiencies 
remain. In contrast, when agents compete to be hired, efficiency improves dramatically, and it 
increases in the relative number of agents because competition reduces the agents’ 
informational monopoly power. However, this environment also generates a high inequality 
level and is characterized by multiple equilibria. In general, there is a fairly high degree of 
correspondence between the theoretical predictions and the contract menus actually chosen 
in each treatment. There is, however, a tendency to choose more ‘generous’ (and more 
efficient) contract menus over time. Competition leads to a substantially higher probability of 
trade, and that, overall, competition between agents generates the most efficient outcomes. 
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   1.  INTRODUCTION 
The theory of markets with asymmetric information has been a “vital and lively field of 
economic research” (2001 Nobel Prize committee) for decades.  The classic ‘lemons’ paper 
(Akerlof 1970) illustrated the point that asymmetric information led to economic inefficiency, 
and could even destroy an efficient market.  Since the seminal works of Vickrey (1961) and 
Mirrlees (1971), research on mechanism design has sought ways to minimize or eliminate this 
problem.
1  In an environment with hidden information (sometimes characterized as adverse 
selection), each agent knows more about her
2 ‘type’ than the principal does at the time of 
contracting.  In the standard labor scenario, a firm hires a worker but knows less than the worker 
does about her innate work disutility.  Other typical applications include a monopolist who is 
trying to price discriminate between buyers with different (privately known) willingness to pay, 
or a regulator who wants to obtain the highest efficient output from a utility company with 
private information about its cost.
3
The fact that agents know their own ability levels while principals may not causes 
difficulties in contracting, as an agent may not choose the action that is in the best interest of the 
principal.  If outcomes are related to actions, firms with complete information could design 
‘first-best’ contracts that theoretically induce truthful revelation of types and generate economic 
efficiency by making the contract contingent on the outcome.  However, in contracting under 
hidden information, the problem is how to induce the efficient action without being able to 
observe the agent’s true type; in this case, it is typically necessary to devise ‘second-best’ 
                                                 
1 Applications include public and regulatory economics (Laffont and Tirole 1993), labor economics (Lazear 1999), 
financial economics (Freixas and Rochet 1997), business management (Milgrom and Roberts 1992), and 
development economics (Ray 1998).  
2 Throughout this paper we assume that the principals are male and the agents are female. 
  1contracts that lead to separation of types, but which are somewhat distorted and less than fully 
efficient.   
Perhaps due to the complexity of business relationships, it is difficult to find support 
from field data for principal-agent theory. While there has been considerable theoretical work on 
contracts in recent decades, empirical tests of the theory have long remained scarce.     
Prendergast (1999)’s and Chiappori and Salanié (2003)’s surveys show that the econometrics of 
contracts has recently become a burgeoning field of research. The latter point however that a 
number of empirical tests suffer from selection and endogeneity biases.  In addition, many 
papers use similar data because of a lack of data on contracts.  These difficulties explain that 
only few empirical tests of the adverse selection problem are available in the literature (see 
notably Cawley and Philipson, 1999; Chiappori and Salanié, 2000; Dahlby, 1983; Dione and 
Doherty, 1994; Finkelstein and Poterba, 2000; Genesove, 1993; Puelz and Snow, 1994; Young 
and Burke, 2001).  Given the difficulties inherent with field data in this area, laboratory 
experiments offer a complementary approach that offers some promise, since it is possible to 
isolate and vary the factors of interest while keeping all others constant. 
We perform experiments designed to test the influence of competition on the 
management of hidden-information problems.  This can be seen as a question of organizational 
or institutional design – what effects do different rules and markets have on performance and 
efficiency?
4  We examine how differing degrees of relative bargaining power between principals 
and agents affect outcomes and efficiency when there is a problem of hidden information.   
                                                                                                                                                             
3 One-shot contracts are common in consumer transactions.  In the public sector, government procurement is often 
conducted on a one-shot basis.   
4 Although we use the standard static screening model, it is worth noting that Kanemoto and MacCleod (1992) 
examine the effect of competition in a dynamic environment and find that one obtains the first-best outcome if there 
is sufficient competition for workers, even with asymmetric information.  Perhaps there is some empirical analog to 
this result in the static case. 
  2Our approach is to systematically vary the type of competition present in the 
environment.  In our benchmark case, each principal is matched with one agent of unknown 
type.  In our second treatment, a principal can select one of three agents, while in a third 
treatment an agent may choose between the contract menus offered by two principals.  Principals 
can choose to offer one of six feasible contract menus, which are held constant across our 
treatments; in turn, agents can select high or low effort, or reject the contract menu entirely and 
receive reservation payoffs.  We derive the equilibrium predictions for each environment and 
include the induced contract menus for each treatment among the six feasible choices for the 
principal.  We examine the outcomes in each treatment, ranking the institutions as a function of 
their relative efficiency, both in terms of effort and the probability of trade.  
In this respect theory provides a first answer. To understand the theoretical efficiency 
ranking, it is important to realize that incomplete information in markets creates inefficiencies 
because the agents have a certain monopoly power.  More precisely, they are the sole ‘owners’ 
of a valuable resource –  information about their type.  We first show from a theoretical point of 
view how different degrees of bargaining power between principals and agents, related to 
various degrees of competition in the market, affect outcomes and efficiency.  In an environment 
where principals compete against each other to hire agents, inefficiencies remain.  In contrast, in 
an environment where agents compete to be hired, efficiency improves dramatically and 
increases in the relative number of agents because competition reduces the agents’ informational 
monopoly power.  However, this environment also generates a high inequality level and is 
characterized by multiple equilibria, which may have important behavioral implications in the 
field if people have social preferences such as inequality aversion. 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
  3Our experiment constitutes the first test of the impact of various competitive frameworks 
on the design of contracts in the presence of both heterogeneous agents and hidden information, 
and their subsequent efficiency.  Our results are mostly supportive of the theory and the major 
implication is that the bargaining power directly affects the choice of contract menus.  In 
comparison with environments in which there is either no competition or a competition among 
principals, our experiment finds that the institutional environment in which agents compete 
against each other the most efficient as far as we consider the contracting pairs.   
Even though, in general, there is a fairly high degree of correspondence between the 
theoretical predictions and the contract menus actually chosen in each treatment, there is a 
tendency to choose more ‘generous’ (and more efficient) contract menus over time.  We find that 
competition leads to a substantially higher probability of trade, and that, overall, competition 
between agents generates the most efficient outcomes. We observe a fairly high degree of 
separation of agents’ types in the choices made in response to the various contract menus; 
interestingly, with agent competition we observe the more able agents foregoing the option that 
would pay them more (if they are chosen), in order to signal their type by choosing the option 
that less able agents should never choose.
5  Our data also show considerable evidence of changes 
in behavior over time, as participants learn what is effective and what is not. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: We review the relevant literature in 
section 2, and we describe our theoretical model and derive its predictions in section 3.  Our 
experimental design and implementation are presented in section 4, with the results given in 
section 5.  We discuss welfare and efficiency considerations in section 6, and conclude in section 
7. 
                                                 
5 As we discuss later, this parallels the Cooper and Kagel (2005) signaling result in an entry game.  
  4 
2.  RELATED LITERATURE 
 Previous experimental studies on asymmetric information have typically examined the 
behavioral issues present with individual contracting with hidden action (also known as moral 
hazard), where effort is not contractible; these studies include Berg, Daley, Dickhaut, and 
O’Brien (1992), Keser and Willinger (2000), Anderhub, Gächter, and Königstein (2002), and 
Königstein (2001).
6  They observe that contracts are usually more generous than theoretically 
predicted and some suggest adding an equity constraint to the standard participation and 
incentive-compatibility constraints in the design of optimal contracts.  Charness and Dufwenberg 
(forthcoming) consider the hidden-action problem and find that cheap-talk statements of intent 
(promises) help to achieve desirable outcomes (the Nash bargaining solution).   
  There is very little experimental work on hidden information and certainly no study 
considers the effect of competition.  Lynch, Miller, Plott and Porter (1986) confirmed the 
existence of a market for “lemons” in experimental oral double auctions, and Holt and Sherman 
(1990) do so in posted–offer auctions.  Experiments by Brandts and Holt (1992) and Banks, 
Camerer and Porter (1994), however, provide mixed evidence about the ability of subtle 
equilibrium refinements to predict players’ behavior in simple signaling games.  DeJong, 
Forsythe, and Lundholm (1985) observe that the low quality/low price outcome is less frequent 
when the buyer cannot distinguish between a rip-off and bad luck.  Cabrales and Charness 
(2004) study the static principal-agent problem with hidden information in the context of team 
                                                 
6 Other studies involving moral hazard include Bull, Schotter, and Weigelt (1987), who examine the incentive 
effects of piece rate and tournament payment schemes, and Nalbantian and Schotter (1997), who investigate group 
incentive contracts. Plott and Wilde (1982), and DeJong, Forsythe, Lundholm, and Uecker (1985) consider moral 
hazard problems with multiple buyers and sellers. Güth, Klose, Königstein, and Schwalbach (1998) consider a 
dynamic moral hazard problem where trust and reciprocity issues impede obtaining the first-best outcome. 
  5production.  They observe that when more equitable menus are proposed, rejection rates are less 
important and agents select actions according to their types.  There are two studies of the 
dynamic contracting problem:  Chaudhuri (1998) and Cooper, Kagel, Lo, and Gu (1999) study 
the problem of the ratchet effect, where the agent has an incentive to conceal her true type, as the 
principal may use this information to ratchet up the demands for performance in later periods.  
Nevertheless, principal-agent interactions in the field are frequently one-shot affairs; 
furthermore, if the principal could commit to an ex ante contract, it would be optimal to 
implement the one-shot problem in the dynamic setting.
7   
One might predict that different forms of competition should lead to different contract 
menus being selected, given the differences in the players’ bargaining power.  However, results 
from the handful of experimental papers on the effects of unbalanced competition on the 
outcomes between firms and workers (or principals and agents) is somewhat mixed.  Brandts and 
Charness (2004) find little difference in the gift-exchange outcomes according to whether there 
are more workers than firms or vice versa.  Fehr,  Kirchler, Weichbold,  and  Gächter (1998) 
show that an unbalanced market eliminates fairness when contracts are complete but not when 
they are incomplete.  On the other hand, Roth et al. (1991) find that principals capture nearly the 
entire surplus when 10 agents compete in a “demand game” similar to the ultimatum game.  
Davis and Holt (1994) show that the ability of a buyer to switch between two sellers provides a 
strong incentive to develop reputation in a repeated game.  In an ultimatum game with 
responders’ competition, Grosskopf (2003) observes that although the initial demands are 
similar, demands in the game with competition become higher over time than in the game with 
no competition.  Finally, Fischbacher, Fong and Fehr (2003) demonstrate that the introduction of 
                                                 
7 In addition, even though a relationship may actually involve repeated play, a firm could choose to pre-commit to a 
  6even a little competition provokes large behavioral changes.  A model combining heterogeneous 
social preferences with decision errors enables to predict most of the experimental evidence with 
various degrees of competition.  Thus, it is not clear ex ante what effects unbalanced competition 
will have on the hidden-information problem, particularly in terms of economic efficiency.  
 
3. THE MODEL 
In this section we describe the theoretical model that serves as the basis for the 
experimental design.  As a preview, we note that the case with competition between principals 
(more principals than agents) yields a Rothschild-Stiglitz type of solution, which is invariant to 
the number of agents and generally inefficient.  On the other hand, the case of competition 
between agents is not invariant to the (relative) number of agents.  The presence of more agents 
relaxes the binding incentive-compatibility constraint (for the high type), yielding a level of 
effort that decreases towards the efficient level with the number of agents.  In the limit, the only 
relevant constraint for the high-type agent is the participation constraint.  As a result, there are 
no inefficiencies.  
Imagine that a firm needs one worker in order to be able to operate. The profits for the 
firm when it is operating are: 
Π = e
 – w 
where e, w are the effort levels and wages of the worker. Each worker has a utility function 
which depends on her type j ∈ {H,L}, which is her private information: 
2
2
) , ( e
k
w w e u
j
j − =  
                                                                                                                                                             
contract, and perhaps cultivate a reputation for integrity by doing so. 
  7where kH = 1 and kL = k > 1.  That is, the high type of agent has a lower cost of effort than the 
lower type.  Thus, only the individual agent knows j, but e is observable and contractible.   
From the utility functions of the principal and the agents we have that the first-best effort 
levels are: 
{ L H j
k
e
j
j , ,
1
ˆ ∈ = }                                (1) 
We call   the efficient level of effort. ˆ  e  j
8  If we denote by U the outside option of the worker 
(which we assume for simplicity to be type-independent) we can induce optimal effort, with: 
{} L H j
k
U w
j
j , ,
2
1
ˆ ∈ + =    
If the (independent) probability that an agent is a high or low type is denoted respectively by   
or  , then the expected (optimal) profits for the principal are given by: 
H p
L p
 
U
k
p
k
p
H
H
L
L E − + = Π
2 2
 
In order to make some comparisons across treatments we hold this first-best contract fixed in all 
the treatments. However, the second-best optimal equilibrium contracts, when the types are 
private information of the agents, depend on the structure of the market, which is our treatment 
variable.  Then the equilibrium contract menu in the Benchmark (one principal-one agent) 
treatment results from the solution of the maximization program: 
  
                                                 
8 This is an appropriate terminology because in all the Pareto-efficient allocations of this problem (with complete 
information) the level of effort is always  . This is so because of the quasi-linearity of the utility function of the 
agents, a common assumption in this field. Thus, the Pareto-efficient allocations only differ in the wages and profits 
of the principal and agent. 
ˆ  e  j
  8) ( ) ( max
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where (IRj) and (ICji) are respectively the individual rationality and incentive compatibility 
constraints of an agent of type j ∈  {H,L}.  As usual in these problems, it turns out that the active 
constraints in the optimal solution are (IRL) and (ICH), so that the solution is:  
 
eH
B =
1
kH
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             (2) 
The high type of agent provides the ‘efficient’ level of effort and obtains utility above U.  These 
informational rents (rents are defined here as the utility an agent gets above her reservation 
utility) are equal to: 
 
     2 ) (
2
1
2
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L
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H e
k
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−
= − −                    (2e) 
  9The effort of the low type of agent is ‘inefficiently’ low and she obtains no rents, because she is 
held to the reservation value (the (IRL) constraint is binding).  This is the subgame-perfect 
equilibrium of this game. 
 
Assume now that the each principal is matched with 3 agents (this is the Excess Agent 
treatment).  Then an equilibrium contract menu results from the solution of a slightly different 
maximization program.  Given that high types are “harder-working” (they have a lower disutility 
of effort) they cost less per unit of output.  Thus when any of the matched agents chooses the 
contract designed for the high type, the principal always chooses her.  If more than one agent 
chooses the high contract, the principal chooses randomly among those selecting the high 
contract.
9
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The (ICH) can also be written 
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  10where 
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The effort of the low type of agent in the EA treatment   is closer to the efficient effort ( EA
L e ˆ  e  L) than 
that in the Benchmark treatment ( ).  To see this note first that both   and   are smaller than  B
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1 ˆ = , but we will now show   , so that the distortion is lower in EA than in B:  B
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The reason for this enhanced efficiency is that the principal distorts the low agent in order to 
lower the rents to the high agent. To see this, note that the informational rents in the Benchmark 
treatment (equation 2e) are increasing in  , so the principal prefers to lower   (thus reducing 
efficiency) in order to get higher profits. But in the EA treatment there is a competitive pressure 
on the high types, the presence of other high types that makes this less necessary.  In fact, it is 
easy to check that in the general model where the principal confronts n agents, the difference 
B
L e B
L e
                                                                                                                                                             
9 We only write the binding constraints, in what follows. 
  11between the equilibrium and the efficient level of effort for the low type goes to zero as n goes to 
infinity.  
Nevertheless, there is an additional problem with this treatment.  We have found the 
equilibrium by assuming that the high types assume that other high types choose the high 
contract.  But that is not the unique equilibrium here. In the second stage, where a menu is 
offered, it is also possible that all agents, both high and low, select the low option for the menu. 
If all agents are choosing the low option, it is indeed a best response to choose low for all of 
them.  But in this case, it need not be optimal to propose the menu of contracts specified in (3).  
In the design of the experiment we provide another menu, which is the equilibrium under the 
assumption that whenever there is multiplicity of equilibria in the second stage, the worst 
equilibrium for the principal is selected.  The equilibrium menu in that case would solve: 
max
wH ,wL ,eH ,eL
(1− pL
3)(eH −wH)+ pL
3(eL −wL)  
subject to 
wL −
kL
2
(eL)
2 ≥ U   (IRL)                                              (4) 
U e
k
w e
k
w L
H
L H
H
H 3
2
) (
2 3
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2
2 2 + ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛ − ≥ −    (ICH) 
where the incentive constraint now ensures that it is dominant to choose the high option for a 
high type (thus she will do it independently of what other individuals of her type are doing). 
Choosing the high contract when the low contract gives a higher payoff makes sense to reduce 
competition from other workers.  In fact the ‘attractiveness’ of the high contract increases with 
the probability that a competing worker also chooses the high option.  So the worst-case scenario 
for the principal is when no competitor chooses the high contract.  If even in that case a high 
  12type should choose the high over the low contract, then it is dominant for a high type to choose 
the high option, and that is exactly what the ICH  constraint in equation (4) does.  
    Finally, we also have a treatment where several principals compete for one agent.  In that 
case, the equilibrium of the game is such that the principals make zero profits for each type of 
contract, the low agent gets an undistorted contract and the high agent is held to his Incentive 
Compatibility constraint (see e.g. Mas-Colell, Green and Whinston, 1995, ch.14D). 
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where  EP
H e  comes from the Incentive constraint for the high type which solves 
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  We implemented the theoretical model in our experiment by choosing a single set of six 
menus allowable in all contracts.  For the parameter values kL =2, kH =1, pL =1/2, equation (3) 
leads to menu 1, equation (4) induces menu 2, equation (2) leads to menu 3, and equation (5) 
induces menu 6.  We provide the details of these mappings into experimental payoffs in section 
3.  In addition we chose two non-equilibrium menus, in order to provide a richer contractual 
environment.  Menu 4 is similar to menu 3, but has a little more effort for the low type, and 
  13respects the IC constraint for the high type.  Menu 5 is fully efficient, for both the high and the 
low types.   
The values for the parameters in the six permitted contract menus are shown in Table 1.  Each 
menu consisted of a choice of two (enforceable) effort levels and payments that depend on the 
type of agent involved; if neither choice seems attractive to the agent, she can veto the contract 
menu.  We chose kL = 2 for all menus, in order to give relatively large rents to the high type 
(under her preferred contracts).  The parameters, efforts, and wages for the different menus in the 
experiment are summarized below: 
Table 1 – Parameter Values 
Menu  kL pL eH eL wH wL
1 2  1/2  1  0.36  0.64  0.25 
2 2  1/2  1  0.23  0.64  0.18 
3 2  1/2  1  0.33  0.70  0.25 
4 2  1/2  1  0.4  0.75  0.33 
5 2  1/2  1  0.50  0.85  0.44 
6  2  1/2  1.50 0.50 1.50 0.50 
 
One of the criticisms of models of contract design with hidden information is that the 
contract menus are more ‘complex’ than one observes in reality.  In an environment like ours, 
these often employ a nonlinear structure and a very large number of possible choices of pairs of 
wages and efforts.  Using a continuous strategy space would be quite complicated to design for 
the principal, and even the choice of the agent would not be simple without adding much insight; 
this would also make the data analysis problematic. While we have selected a very simple 
structure (only two types), we feel that a ‘simple’ menu can serve as an approximation for a full 
schedule.  As Wilson (1993) points out (p. 146) in a representative example: “The firm’s profits 
  14from the five-part and two-part tariffs are 98.8% and 88.9% of the profits from the nonlinear 
tariff.”  
 
4.  EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
We conducted three different treatments, which differed according to the numbers of 
principals and agents in the treatment.  In our Benchmark (B) treatment, there were 10 principals 
and 10 agents in each session.  In the Excess Agents (EA) treatment, there were four principals 
and 12 agents, while in the Excess Principals (EP) treatment, there were 12 principals and six 
agents.
10  In all cases, there were equal numbers of high (H) agents and low (L) agents and this 
was made common knowledge among the participants.  In order to observe roughly similar 
numbers of observations (matches) in each treatment, we conducted four sessions of the EA 
treatment, three sessions of the EP treatment, and two sessions of the B treatment.  Each session 
consisted of 40 periods of play to allow for possible learning dynamics, with random and 
anonymous re-matching after every period.  The re-matching procedure was common 
information to the participants.  The organization of our sessions is summarized in Table 2. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 – Treatments and sessions 
Participants per session 
                                                 
10 We chose 3 agents per principal in the EA treatment because the theoretical model shows that the distortion 
between the efficient level of effort and the equilibrium effort reduces in the number of competing agents; in 
addition, it increases the probability to be matched with at least one high agent. In the EP treatment, we chose to 
match two principals with one agent because the theoretical predictions are not sensitive to the size of the competing 
pool. 
  15Participants per session 
Treatment 
Principal
s 
H-agents L-agents
Sessions  Periods  Observations 
Benchmark   10  5  5  2  40  800 
Excess Agent  4  6  6  4  40  640 
Excess Principal  12  3  3  3  40  720 
Total 72  43  43  9  -  2160 
 
The sessions were conducted at the Groupe d’Analyse et de Théorie Economique 
(GATE), CNRS, France. The subjects were recruited from undergraduate courses in local 
Engineering and Business schools.  Some of the subjects had participated in previous 
experiments, but all of the subjects were inexperienced in this particular type of experiment.  No 
subject participated in more than one session of the study.  On average, a session lasted 60 
minutes, including initial instructions and payment of subjects. The experiment was 
computerized using the REGATE program developed at GATE (Zeiliger, 2000).    
The participants were privately informed of their role; agents were also informed of their 
type.  One’s role and/or type were kept constant throughout the session.  The participants also 
knew that there were the same number of low type and high type agents in the room. In our B 
treatment, the “proposer” (principal) first makes a selection from among the six “offers” 
(feasible contract menus).  The “responder” (agent) is informed of this choice, and then selects 
“option X” (high contract), “option Y” (low contract), or rejects the contract menu.  Each person 
then learns his or her payoff and play then continues on to the next period.  The sequence in the 
EA treatment is similar, except that the principal is informed of the options chosen by each of the 
three agents and then selects one of these agents.  No agent is informed about the choices of the 
two other agents. The EP treatment has the same sequence as the B treatment, with the proviso 
that an agent can accept at most one offer from the two principals with whom she is paired. 
  16When both principals make the same offer, the agent chooses at random between the two 
principals if she is willing to accept the offer.  The principal is not informed of the offer of the 
other principal. 
We used the parameter values in Table 1 to generate experimental payoffs for the feasible 
contract menus.  We first derived the payoffs from these parameters to three decimals and then 
multiplied these by one thousand.  We next rounded these payoffs to the nearest multiple of 5.  
In the case of the principals, we added 250 to each of the non-rejection payoffs; this reflects the 
notion that setting up the firm requires some capital, and the minimum level of revenues that are 
needed to recoup the cost of capital is 250.  In the case of the agents, we added 10 to each non-
rejection payoff, in order to provide some minimal separation (avoiding indifference) between 
the payoff for a low agent who accepts the least favorable offer and her payoff from rejecting the 
contract menu in its entirety.
11  Unmatched principals or agents received 125 points in the 
period.  This process leads to Table 3 that was distributed to the subjects to help them to make 
their decisions (except that the term  “menu” was replaced by that of “offer”).
12. 
We used a conversion rate of 100 points for each Euro.  At the end of each session, we 
selected (at random) four of the 40 periods for actual payment.  In this way, we avoided possible 
income effects from having already accumulated a known amount of financial remuneration in 
the session.   The average payoff was 14.9 Euros in the Benchmark treatment, and 13.5 Euros in 
both the Excess Agent and the Excess Principal treatments; on average the principals received 17 
Euros, the high agents 13 Euros and the low agents 10 Euros, including a 4 Euro show-up fee. 
                                                 
11 As it happens, we inadvertently added 20 points to the L payoffs from option Y with menu 4.  Perhaps this turns 
out to be useful for testing what is needed to obtain efficiency. The reason is that even with this extra kick, the B 
treatment is least efficient once rejections are considered. Thus, there is an argument that competition between 
agents is good for efficiency because it reduces informational rents, both in theory and in practice. And that 
  17Table 3 – Payoff Table 
  Option X  Option Y  Reject 
                      P   610  355  125 
    Menu 1     H  150  200  125 
                      L  -350  135  125 
    
                      P   605  305  125 
    Menu 2     H  155  160  125 
                      L  -345  135  125 
    
                      P   550  335  125 
    Menu 3     H  210  200  125 
                      L  -310  145  125 
    
                      P   500  350  125 
    Menu 4     H  260  230  125 
                      L  -240  160  125 
    
                      P   400  310  125 
    Menu 5     H  360  325  125 
                      L  -140  200  125 
    
                      P   250  250  125 
    Menu 6     H  385  385  125 
                      L  -740  260  125 
 
 
5.  EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
An overview of our experimental results is that we find substantial treatment effects in 
our sessions, with large differences in the contract menus offered and accepted, substantially in 
line with the equilibrium predictions.  The menus that are offered (and accepted) evolve over 
time.  In general, rejections and competition drive behavior.  We first give descriptive statistics 
                                                                                                                                                             
principal competition enhances efficiency as it reduces the envy-driven rejections that hurt efficiency in the 
benchmark. 
12 See also the instructions in the Appendix A. 
  18for principal behavior and agent behavior, supplemented with charts.  We then consider the 
determinants of such behavior, providing statistical tests and regression analysis. 
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Principal behavior 
  While there is certainly some heterogeneity present among the principals, we do observe 
some clear patterns and differences for the menus chosen in each treatment.  We list the menus 
offered in each treatment in Table 4. 
 
Table 4 – Menus offered, by treatment  
Menu Offer  B treatment   EA treatment  EP treatment 
1 89  (11.12)  181 (28.28)  56 (3.89) 
2 17  (2.12)  34 (5.31)  28 (1.94) 
3  242 (30.25)  348 (54.38)  57 (4.96) 
4  361 (45.13)  58 (9.06)  136 (9.44) 
5  75 (9.38)  16 (2.50)  490 (34.03) 
6  16 (2.00)    3 (0.47)  673 (46.74) 
Total  800 (100)  640 (100)  1440 (100) 
 
Note: Equilibrium menus are in bold.  Percentages are in parentheses. 
 
The EA treatment has the ‘lowest’ contract menus (the ones most favorable to the principal), the 
EP treatment has the ‘highest’ menus (the ones most favorable to the agents), and the B 
treatment features intermediate menus.  There is some support for the equilibrium predictions, as 
30% of the menus offered in the B treatment, 34% of the menus offered in the EA treatment, and 
47% of the menus offered in treatment EP are equilibrium menus (menus 1 and 2 with EA, menu 
3 with B, and menu 6 with EP).  However, menu 4 is the most common choice in the B treatment 
and menu 3 is the most common choice in the EA treatment.   
  19As menu 3 has a more egalitarian distribution than menu 1 (EA treatment) and also 
provides greater efficiency (higher total payoffs), one might suspect that social preferences such 
as those expressed in the Charness and Rabin (2002) model play a role here; a similar comment 
applies vis-à-vis menu 4 and menu 3 (B treatment).  However, to the extent that these represent 
social preferences on the part of the principals, we should expect to see these choices from the 
beginning.  Instead, the menus offered evolves over time, as can be seen in Figures 1-3. 
Figure 1: Menu Offered over Time, Benchmark 
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Figure 2: Menu Offered over Time, EA 
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  20Figure 3: Menu Offered over Time, EP 
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In each of these treatments, there is some distribution across menus in the initial periods, 
but we typically see that two menus comprise the great majority of the menus offered thereafter 
in each treatment.  In every case, it is the ‘higher’ menu that grows in frequency over time.  
Thus, it seems that some other force is inducing principals to choose more generous menus over 
time, even though principals’ social preferences may perhaps account for some of the generous 
menu choices.  In every treatment, one menu predominates in the last group of periods, 
averaging about 60% of all menus offered (although there is a dip in favor of the equilibrium 
menu in EA). 
While we postpone an in-depth analysis of the determinants of the contract menus offered 
by principals, Table 5 below shows the ex post profitability of these offers in our treatments; 
It is clear that the profitability of a particular contract menu depends greatly on the 
competitive environment.  Menus 1 and 2 yield highest profits for the principal in the EA 
treatment, but generate low profits in the B and EP treatments.  Similarly, menu 6 is quite 
unattractive for the principal in the EA and B treatments, but provides nearly the best profits in 
the EP treatment (and the best in the final periods).  Overall, we observe a good correspondence 
  21between the most frequent offers made and their profitability; thus, to a large extent, it seems 
that principals are influenced by considerations of their own profits. 
Table 5 – Ex post principal payoffs, by menu and treatment  
Menu Offer  B treatment   EA treatment  EP treatment 
1  270 (194)   516 (527)  146 (125) 
2  210 (215)   528 (527)  125 (125) 
3 334  (318)   520 (519)  147 (125) 
4  392 (384)   478 (500)  180 (170) 
5  346 (353)   372 (---)  219 (185) 
6  250 (250)   250 (250)  214 (205) 
 
Note: The most frequent menus are in bold.  Payoffs for the last eight periods are in parentheses.  
 
Agent behavior 
  The menus accepted by the agents naturally mirror the menus that were offered; however, 
there are some substantial differences, due primarily to rejections in the B treatment and 
selection pressures in the EP treatment.  More favorable menus are more likely to be accepted in 
the B treatment, with 142 rejections of the 800 contract menus offered.  The acceptance rate is 
90% for menu 4, 75% for menu 3, but only 61% for menu 1.  In addition, less favorable menus 
are not likely to be selected by agents in the EP treatment although rejections of offers from both 
principals occurred only twice.  The punishment for offering an unfavorable contract menu is 
simply that no agent will select it.  Menus 1 to 3 are only accepted about 5% of the time; in fact, 
these menus were never accepted in the final eight periods, and menu 4 was only accepted twice 
out of the 144 times it was offered in these periods.  Finally, rejections in the EA treatment are 
not actually costly for the principal, since an offer has always been accepted by at least one 
agent.  
  22We summarize agent behavior by listing the number of accepted menus (column 1), the 
rate of acceptance (column 2), and the proportion of X option chosen (column 3) in each 
treatment in Table 6 for the high agents and Table 7 for the low agents. 
Table 6 – High agents' choices, by treatment  
B treatment   EA treatment   EP treatment  Menu 
Offer  Nb  %accept  % X  Nb  %accept % X  Nb  %accept  % X 
1 36  80.00 0 271  94.76 63.10  1   5.00  0 
2 6    60.00 0  46  93.88 71.74  0   0.00  - 
3  97   94.17 57.73 513  98.28 94.54  2    8.70 100 
4  191   95.50   79.06  82   100  95.12  10  16.95  80.00
5 37  100  86.49  16  100  93.75  102  39.23  98.04
6 5  100  60.00  5  100  80.00  245 70.61  68.16
Total  372   93.00 65.06 933 97.19 84.24 360  50.00  76.94
 
Table 7 – Low agents' choices, by treatment  
B treatment   EA treatment   EP treatment  Menu Offer 
Nb  %accept  % X  Nb  %accept % X  Nb  %accept  % X 
1 18    40.91 11.11  212  82.49 1.42  4   11.11  0 
2 2    28.57 0  47   88.68 0  0   0.00  0 
3  85   61.15 2.35  446  85.44 0  2  5.88  0 
4  134   83.23  2.98  92   100  0  18  23.38  0 
5 36  94.74  5.56  32  100  0  99  43.04  0 
6  11   100  9.09  4   100  0  235 72.09  0 
Total 286    71.50  3.85  833  86.77  0  358  49.72  0 
Note: Equilibrium menus are in bold. 
 
  We do see that the rejection rate for low agents is always much higher than the rate for 
high agents, more than four times as high in both treatments B and EA.  When they accept an 
offer, low agents rarely chose option X, which would generate negative earnings.  The behavior 
  23of high agents is more complex.  Note that option X pays more than option Y for high types with 
menus 3-5, but option Y pays more with menus 1 and 2.  In addition, both options give the same 
payoff to the high type with menu 6.  In the EP treatment, high agents nearly always maximize 
own payoffs (356 of 360 non-rejections).  While they also do so with menus 1, 2, 5, and 6 in 
treatment B, we observe a substantial proportion of option-Y choices with menus 3 and 4 (42% 
and 21% of the non-rejection choices, respectively).   
In the EA treatment, recall that agents’ choices are known to the principals prior to 
selecting an agent, so that agents must compete in their choices to be selected.  High agents do 
maximize own profits with menus 3-5, since this maximization also coincides with maximizing 
the profits for the principal.  However, with menus 1 and 2, an agent who myopically chooses 
option Y runs the risk that his principal will not select him by if another agent has chosen option 
X.  Since some agents appear to realize this, we observe that 64% of the high agents choose 
option X when accepting menus 1 or 2.  Figure 4 shows that high agents appear to be learning to 
do so over time, as this likelihood increases during the first half of the sessions.
13  We also chart 
menu 3 for comparison, to show a ‘best-case scenario’ for the X option, since a high agent trying 
to compete should always choose it; note the lack of a time trend. 
                                                 
13 An indirect consequence of this pattern is that principals in the EA treatment are increasingly successful in 
obtaining option X in response to menu 1 or menu 2.  Overall, option X was obtained 67% of the time in response 
to these menus; this proportion was 63% during the first 20 periods and 72% during the last 20 periods. 
  24Figure 4: Likelihood of X Option over Time in EA, 
High agents 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
1-8 9-16 17-24 25-32 33-40
Period Range
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
Menus 1&2
Menu 3
 
As a consequence of these decisions, the proportion of high agents actually recruited is 
larger in EA (81%) than in B (57%).  While in B this distortion of the initial distribution of the 
population reflects the higher frequency of rejections of offers by low agents, in EA this reflects 
the process of selection related to the competitive environment.  In EP, the proportion of high 
agents (50.14%) corresponds roughly to the initial distribution of the population since almost all 
the agents accept an offer.  Regarding the evolution over time of the proportion of high agents,  
the selection process does not take a long time before being fully operative in EA, whereas there 
is almost no evolution in B.  The percentage of high type among the agents recruited in EA rises 
from 71% in periods 1 to 8 up to 87% in periods 9 to 16 and stays above 81% in the following 
periods, whereas the proportion stays between 55 and 57% in B throughout the game. 
 
4.2 Regression analysis 
It appears that there are substantial and significant differences in both principal and agent 
behavior across treatments.  We now turn to multiple-regression analysis of the determinants of 
the observed behavior, first considering the menus offered by principals.
14  In order to 
                                                 
14 We also performed nonparametric Mann-Whitney rank-sum tests, with both session-level and individual-level 
data (see Appendix B).  These tests find that the average menu offered is lowest in the EA sessions and highest in 
  25disentangle the motivations underlying offers of the different categories of menus, we estimate 
multinomial logit models with robust standard errors, in which the reference category is the offer 
of the equilibrium menu.  To better understand the choice of the most frequent menu that is not 
necessarily the equilibrium one, we also estimate ordered probit models with robust standard 
errors in which the switch to the most frequent menu offer is the dependent variable, equal to +1 
if the menu increased, 0 if unchanged, and -1 if it decreased.   In all the regressions, we include a 
time trend to identify a possible evolution over time.  The first three columns of Table 8 presents 
the results of the multinomial logit model and the fourth column the results of the ordered probit 
model for the contract menus chosen in the B treatment.  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
the EP sessions.  They also indicate that rejection rates of menus below 4 are significantly higher in the B than in 
the EA treatments and that high agents in B are more likely to choose option X in response to menus 1 and 2 than in 
EA, the reverse being true for menu 3.  Overall, they show that the proportion of high agents is higher in EA than in 
B. 
  26Table 8: Determinants of the choice of menus in the Benchmark Treatment 
 
  Multinomial Logit model   Ordered Probit model 
Ref.: offer of  the 
equilibrium menu 
Offer of 
menus 1 - 2 
Offer of 
menu 4 
Offer of 
menus 5 - 6
Switch to menu 4 
Time trend  
 
Lagged rejection 
rate 
X option chosen 
in (t-1) 
Constant 
-0.051*** 
(0.015) 
0.043*** 
(0.013) 
-1.366*** 
(0.383) 
-0.376 
(0.340) 
0.057*** 
(0.009) 
-0.053*** 
(0.011) 
0.176 
(0.197) 
-0.053 
(0.227) 
0.008 
(0.015) 
0.014 
(0.013) 
-0.355 
(0.301) 
-1.183*** 
(0.333) 
-0.018** 
(0.007) 
0.004 
(0.011) 
-0.321** 
(0.139) 
 
Nb observations 
Log Likelihood 
Wald χ
2
Prob>χ
2 
Pseudo R
2
641 
-701.339 
87.55 
0.000 
0.087 
316 
-219.847 
9.960 
0.028 
0.028 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***, and ** denote two-tailed statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Menus 1 and 2 are chosen less frequently over the course of the sessions, while menu 4 is 
increasingly preferred to menu 3 in the latter periods of the sessions.
15  The offer of very 
generous menus (11% of offers) does not follow a clear trend.  
A principal who experiences a high proportion of rejections of his previous offers is more 
likely to offer menus 1-2 and less likely to offer menu 4.  This may suggest some inertia in the 
motivations driving behavior.  Indeed, a principal who is driven by social preferences makes 
more generous offers, experiences fewer rejections, and is encouraged to continue to offer 
generous menus.  Moreover, an agent choosing the X option in the previous period (which never 
occurs in reaction to menus 1-2) strongly decreases the likelihood of menu 1-2 being chosen by 
the principal. This makes sense because offering these menus would induce both types to switch 
  27to the low option.  The ordered probit regression regarding switching from any menu to the most 
frequent menu 4 indicates that such a switch is more frequent at the beginning of the game.  It is 
less likely if the agent has chosen the X option in the previous period.  It shows no significance 
for whether the principal has experienced a high proportion of rejections in the past.  In contrast, 
a similar regression in which the lagged option is replaced by the rejection of the menu offer in 
the previous period (not reported here) indicates that a rejection strongly favors such a switch.  
Overall, these regressions suggest that offering a more generous menu than the equilibrium is 
driven by the experience of recent rejections and the selection of low-type agents, whereas 
offering very generous menus (5 or 6) does not depend on any of these variables, suggesting a 
preference for more egalitarian outcomes.  
Table 9 presents the results for the menus chosen in the EA treatment.   In the first two 
columns, we pool together the offers of menus 4 to 6 since they represent only 12% of the 
observations.  The third column displays the results of the ordered probit model in which the 
switch to the most frequent menu 3 is explained.  In contrast with the previous regression, we do 
not include the lagged rejection rate as an independent variable since all the contracts are 
accepted.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
15 The same regression in which we replaced the time trend by period range dummies indicate that, regarding menus 
  28Table 9: Determinants of the choice of menus in the Excess Agent Treatment 
  Multinomial Logit model  Ordered Probit model
Ref.: offer of the 
equilibrium menu 
Offer of 
menu 3 
Offer of 
menus 4 - 6 
Switch to menu 3 
Time trend 
 
X option chosen in 
(t-1) 
X option * menu 1-2 in 
(t-1) 
Constant 
0.019* 
(0.010) 
1.673*** 
(0.256) 
-3.679*** 
(0.305) 
-0.235 
(0.281) 
-0.021* 
(0.013) 
0.345 
(0.329) 
-2.228*** 
(0.403) 
-0.121 
(0.305) 
0.004 
(0.007) 
-0.758*** 
(0.236) 
 
 
 
Nb observations 
Log Likelihood 
Wald χ
2
Prob>χ
2 
Pseudo R
2
624 
-466.574 
192.19 
0.000 
0.212 
345 
-194.053 
10.39 
0.006 
0.041 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** and * denote two-tailed statistical significance 
at the 1% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Menu 3 is chosen more frequently over time (we know from an alternative regression that 
this is particularly the case in periods 17-32,significant at 1%), whereas the frequency of menus 
4-6 decreases (especially in the final eight periods with a coefficient significant at the 5% level).  
If the X option was chosen in the previous period in response to the offer of the equilibrium 
menu, this decreases the likelihood of non-equilibrium menus being offered; this makes sense, 
since the X option leads to a higher payoff for the principal, and so there is less motivation to 
offer a more generous menu.  On the other hand, if the X option was chosen in the previous 
period (in reaction to whichever offers), this increases the likelihood of menu 3 being chosen but 
this has no significant effect on the offer of menu 4-6.  If we separate out the case when menu 3 
is chosen (column 3), we see that switching to menu 3 is much less likely when the X option has 
been chosen in the previous period. 
                                                                                                                                                             
1, 2 and 4, all period ranges are significant at the 1% level except periods 9-16, significant at the 10% level. 
  29Table 10 presents the results for the contract menus chosen in the Excess Principal 
treatment.  In the first two columns, we pool together menus 1 to 4 since they only represent 
19% of the observations.  In contrast with the previous treatments, we include among the 
independent variables both the lagged acceptance of the principal’s offer and the lagged rejection 
rate instead of the lagged option chosen by the agent, in order not to eliminate half of the 
observations and because both the principal and the high-type agent are indifferent between the 
two options with menu 6.  Column 3 displays the results of a random-effects probit model in 
which the switch to both the equilibrium and most frequent menu offer is the explained 
variable.
16   
Table 10: Determinants of the choice of menus in the Excess Principal Treatment 
Multinomial Logit model with 
robust S.E. 
Random-effect Probit model   
Ref.: offer of  the 
equilibrium menu  Offer of 
menus 1-4 
Offer of 
menu 5 
Switch to menu 6 
Time trend 
 
Acceptance of the 
offer in (t-1) 
Lagged rejection rate 
 
Constant 
-0.083*** 
(0.008) 
-0.166 
(0.167) 
0.033*** 
(0.005) 
-0.929*** 
(0.351) 
-0.062*** 
(0.006) 
0.111 
(0.136) 
0.012*** 
(0.004) 
0.392 
(0.243) 
-0.068*** 
(0.009) 
-2.266*** 
(0.204) 
0.001 
(0.009) 
2.185*** 
(0.649) 
Nb observations 
Log Likelihood 
Wald χ
2
Prob>χ
2 
Pseudo R
2
1404 
-1312.510 
215.390 
0.000 
0.090 
671 
-221.422 
147.600 
0.000 
Note: *** denote two-tailed significance at the 1% level. 
 
There is a strong time trend in favor of menu 6 being chosen, while the offer of less 
egalitarian menus decreases more strongly over time (in the detailed regression, not reported 
                                                 
16 Indeed, an ordered probit model would not be appropriate because data are censored at menu 6. 
  30here, all the period range coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level and decrease 
over time).  Although the acceptance of the offer in the previous period has little effect on the 
choice of any kind of menu, there is a strong and positive correlation between a high rejection 
rate in the past and the offer of less generous menus.  In contrast, the probit regression regarding 
switching to menu 6 shows that the rejection of an offer in the previous period increases the 
likelihood of such a switch, whereas the overall lagged rejection rate exerts no specific impact.  
The switch is also more likely in the early periods of the game.  The competitive pressure to 
choose a favorable menu is naturally a major factor in the principal’s choice of contract to offer. 
Another approach is to focus directly on whether a principal changes the contract menu 
from one period to the next.
17  We might expect that a principal who is primarily interested in 
maximizing his own payoff would change the contract menu offered on the basis of expected 
profit, so that the payoff received from the previous menu offered would be critical.  We 
consider this factor, along with a time trend in the following ordered probit regressions with 
robust standard errors in which data from all treatments are pooled.  Menu change is the 
dependent variable, equal to +1 if the menu increased, 0 if unchanged, and -1 if it decreased.  
The results of these regressions are reported in Table 11: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17  A possible limitation is that the menu change is censored if the prior menu was 1 or 6 in these regressions. 
  31Table 11: Contract menu changes and lagged payoffs 
Independent variable  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Lagged principal's payoff  -0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
B* lagged principal's payoff  -  -  -0.001*** 
(0.000) 
EP* lagged principal's payoff  -  -  -0.002*** 
(0.000) 
Period -  -0.005*** 
(0.001) 
-0.006*** 
(0.001) 
Nb observations 
Log pseudo-likelihood 
Wald χ
2
Prob>χ
2 
Pseudo R
2
2808 
-2671.8 
26.270 
0.000 
0.006 
2808 
-2668.8 
32.600 
0.000 
0.007 
2808 
-2636.9 
60.800 
0.000 
0.019 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** denote two-tailed 
statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 
In all cases, the lagged payoff is a very significant determinant of whether the principal 
left the contract menu unchanged or chose to increase or decrease it.  Menus increased 
(decreased) when the previous payoff was lower, as with rejection or the Y option being chosen.  
When we consider lagged payoffs separately for each of our three treatments, we find that the 
coefficient is significantly negative in the EA treatment, and is even more negative (and 
significant) in the B and EP treatments.  The effect of lagged payoffs is strongest in the EP 
treatment, as not being chosen generates a low payoff and so is to be avoided.  We also observe a 
clear negative time trend in all specifications. An additional regression (not reported here) 
indicates little difference in this trend across treatments. 
We next analyze the agents' decisions of whether to accept a contract menu and (for high 
agents) which option to choose if accepting a contract.  Table 12 shows random-effects probit 
  32regressions for the three treatments.  Note that regarding the Excess Principal treatment, we 
explain the likelihood of an acceptance from the principal’s and not from the agent’s point of 
view since, with the exception of two rejections of both offers, the agent always accepts one 
offer and selects the best one among the two, or chooses at random in case of a tie. 
 
Table 12: Determinants of the decision to accept a contract offer (Random-effects 
Probit models) 
 
Decision to 
accept the offer 
B and EA 
Treatments  
Benchmark 
Treatment 
Excess Agent 
Treatment 
Excess Principal 
Treatment 
Time trend 
 
Excess Agent 
Treatment 
High-type agent 
 
Offer 
 
Lagged offer 
 
Lagged % of  
no selection  
Constant 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
1.245*** 
(0.361) 
1.120*** 
(0.292) 
0.489*** 
(0.048) 
-0.073* 
(0.045) 
 
 
-0.263 
(0.411) 
-0.012* 
(0.007) 
 
 
1.399*** 
(0.549) 
0.759*** 
(0.080) 
-0.130* 
(0.070) 
 
 
-0.772 
(0.543) 
0.007 
(0.006) 
 
 
1.189*** 
(0.353) 
0.255*** 
(0.064) 
-0.018 
(0.063) 
0.008** 
(0.004) 
0.545 
(0.382) 
-0.025*** 
(0.004) 
 
 
-0.110 
(0.072) 
0.734*** 
(0.049) 
 
 
 
 
 
-3.255*** 
(0.242) 
Nb observations 
Log Likelihood 
Wald χ
2
Prob>χ
2
2652 
-496.467 
118.650 
0.000 
780 
-204.915 
96.830 
0.000 
1832 
-262.181 
29.110 
0.000 
1440 
-822.616 
219.910 
0.000 
Note: ***, **, and * denote two-tailed significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
  In all three treatments, the table confirms that higher offers (indexed from 1 to 6) are 
more likely to be accepted.  We also see a large difference in acceptance rates, as high agents in 
both the B and EA treatments are significantly more likely to accept an offered contract than are 
low agents in these treatments.  This cannot influence offers’ acceptance in the EP treatment, 
  33since each type of agent is able to accept the best offer.  A couple of more ‘psychological’ 
factors come into play as well.  In the B treatment, agents are influenced by the previous contract 
offered to them (although this effect is marginally significant); holding the current offer constant, 
the better the previous offer, the less likely the agent will accept a contract offer.  This effect 
nearly vanishes in the EA treatment, where we instead observe that an agent who was hired less 
often in the prior periods is significantly more likely to accept the current contract offer.  When 
we pool the EA and B data, we find that a contract is much more likely to be accepted in the EA 
treatment, illustrating the effect of competitive pressure. 
  We then explore the determinants of the option chosen by an agent who accepts a 
contract.  Since low agents incur serious losses if they choose the X option, we focus only on 
high agents.  Since the payoff for the high agent is the same for menu 6, regardless of the option 
chosen, we also omit this menu (5 observations in B and in EA) and the EP treatment, where it 
prevails, from the analysis. 
Table 13: Determinants of the choice of option X by the high-type agents who accepted an 
offer (Random-effects Probit models) 
 
Choice of option X  Benchmark Treatment  Excess Agent Treatment 
Time trend 
 
Accepted contract 
 
Lagged selection  
 
Constant 
-0.020* 
(0.012) 
2.342*** 
(0.232) 
 
 
-7.241*** 
(0.919) 
0.017*** 
(0.006) 
0.878*** 
(0.083) 
0.304** 
(0.138) 
-1.045*** 
(0.298) 
Nb observations 
Log Likelihood 
Wald χ
2
Prob>χ
2
367 
-58.564 
101.84 
0.000 
886 
-244.578 
119.98 
0.000 
Note: ***, **, and * denote two-tailed significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  34We see that the higher the contract, the more likely the high agent is to choose option X. 
Option X is chosen less frequently over time in the B treatment, as it seems that high agents 
develop a taste for more favorable contracts and make modest sacrifices by choosing Y instead 
of X (rather than costly rejections) to punish the principal for a lack of generosity.   In contrast, 
option X is chosen more and more frequently over time in the EA treatment since the high agents 
also learn to make modest sacrifices, by choosing X instead of Y when they accept contracts 1 or 
2, to increase the likelihood of their hiring. Finally, we see a significant effect in the EA 
treatment of not having been hired in the previous period, suggesting that the agents try to catch 
up by choosing the X option.  
 
6.  WELFARE AND EFFICIENCY COMPARISONS 
Welfare comparisons across treatments are complicated for at least two reasons.  One is 
that in EA and EP there is an unbalanced structure of principals and agents, so that some parties 
remain unmatched.  The right assumption in this case, we think, is to consider only the 
individuals who are actually matched; equivalently, one might think of this is how much benefit 
society derives from a match.  More importantly, the numbers of matches with the high agents is 
likely to be higher in the EA treatment, which necessarily gives a boost to the total payoffs in this 
treatment.  In order to deal with this, we supply separate comparisons matches involving high 
and low agents.  Finally, the kinds of theoretical distortions at the equilibrium are different in the 
EP treatment (where the high agents’ contract forces them to work more than the efficient level) 
than in either the EA or the B treatments (where the low types work less than the efficient level). 
  35Having said this, the equilibrium prediction (given by equation (3)) of the EA treatment 
seems unambiguously better when compared with the B treatment (given by equation (1)).
18  
There is a higher proportion of the matches with the more productive high agents in EA than in 
B.  In addition, in the equilibrium of the EA treatment there is less distortion for the high agent 
than in the equilibrium of B; this can be seen in both equation (3’) and Table 1.  
The comparison between the B and the EP treatment is theoretically more complicated, 
since the distortion occurs for different individuals, the high agents in the EP treatment and the 
low agents in the B treatment.  But since we expect an equal number of high and low agents to be 
matched in both cases, we can compare the relative value of the distortions of high and low types 
in both treatments.  The loss in welfare with respect to first best (in equilibrium) for the low 
agents’ contract in B is  ⎟
⎠
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⎜
⎝
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e . With our parameterization, the 
loss in B is 0.03 whereas the loss in EP is 0.12. Thus, in our experimental framework, the 
equilibrium in EP would lead to lower overall welfare than the equilibrium in B, which in turn 
would lead to lower overall welfare than the equilibrium in EA.  
With the contract menus and payoff parameters we chose, we find that the greatest 
benefits accrue to society from a match when there are many agents competing to be hired.  If we 
consider the theoretical predictions regarding efficiency, we should observe menu 1 or 2 in EA, 
menu 3 in B, and menu 6 in EP.  While only half of the matches in B and EP would involve high 
agents, 87.50% (on average) of the matches in EA should be with high agents.  So in EA (with 
                                                 
18 As we noted previously, the EA treatment has other equilibria, and we selected the contracts of one of those 
equilibria for one of the available menus in the experiment. The equilibrium given by (3) is the one, however, that 
  36menu 2, the worst case for efficiency), the average total payoff should be 720, in B the average 
total payoff should be 620, and in EP the average total payoff should be 572.50.  EA gives the 
most efficiency; the EA > B > EP ordering also matches the pattern for accepted contracts. 
The data show a qualitatively similar pattern. The overall average payoffs per treatment, 
which are a direct measure of efficiency since they take into account both the type and the effort 
of the recruited agents, are ordered in the same manner as that predicted theoretically.  These 
welfare considerations/average payoffs are shown in Table 14: 
Table 14: Welfare comparisons (average total payoffs) across treatments 
Variable  B treatment  EA treatment  EP treatment 
Average total payoff  538.46  698.97  590.42 
Total payoff if contract accepted  600.71  698.97  591.36 
Total payoff if H accepts contract  687.89  749.33  672.67 
Total payoff if L accepts contract  487.31  480.75  509.61 
  
We see that the EA treatment easily yields the highest average total payoff (line 1).  One 
reason for this is that (ex post) every contract is accepted by at least one of the paired agents in 
the EA treatment.  The EP treatment slightly dominates B in terms of average total payoff since 
only 2 agents reject the offer of both principals, while the B treatment has a substantial rejection 
rate.  Nevertheless, if we ‘level the playing field’ by considering only accepted contracts, the EA 
treatment still generates the highest degree of efficiency.  Mann-Whitney tests find that the total 
payoffs are higher in EA than in both B (Z = 1.85 and p = 0.06) and EP (Z = 2.14 and p = 0.03).  
One reason why EA  empirically yields higher payoffs than B or EP is for one of the two 
theoretical reasons: the possibility of selection means that there are more matches with high 
                                                                                                                                                             
seems more relevant for the data. 
  37agents in EA (81%, against 57% in B and 50% in EP) and these yield higher total payoffs per 
match.   
Nevertheless, even if there were an equal number of matches with high and low agents in 
EA, it would still be the treatment with the highest total payoffs, either with or without rejections 
(615.04).   Note, however, that our theory over-predicts payoffs in the presence of competition 
among agents and under-predicts them in the presence of competition between principals.   
Indeed, the total payoff in EA is slightly under the predicted 720 (p = 0.040, according to a t-
test), whereas the total payoff in B is not different from the predicted 620 (p = 0.420) and it is 
even higher in the EP treatment than the predicted 572.50 (p = 0.004).   
If we only consider welfare with low agents, the best treatment is the EP treatment.  
Perhaps this is because high and low agents each net the principal the same profits, regardless of 
the option chosen, and so are equivalent in some sense.  However, option X is so relatively 
inefficient in menu 6 (total payoffs of 635, compared to 760 with all other menus) that the EP 
treatment cannot be the best overall.  
One immediately wonders just how robust the EA-efficiency result is to alternative 
specifications.  Excess agents are necessarily better than the benchmark, since when the number 
of excess agents goes to infinity, there is no distortion for even low agents, so we obtain first-
best efficiency (proof upon request).  The comparison with EP is a matter of parameterization, 
for fixed numbers (3) of Excess agents.  With excess principals the outcome is the same no 
matter how many principals you have, so there would always be some inefficiency.  Thus, there 
is a sense in which EA is ‘best’, if the relative number of agents can grow large. 
However, this conclusion about the higher efficiency of the EA institutional environment 
should be qualified if we account for those agents who get unmatched in this environment.  
  38Indeed, if the EA environment provides the biggest benefit from a match to the society, it may 
generate a higher social cost than the benchmark if the unmatched agents remain unemployed.  
Including all participants, the average individual payoff amounts to 269 in B, 237 in EA and 238 
in EP.  Therefore, there may be a dilemma: a higher competitive pressure among agents helps in 
getting closer to the first-best efficiency with the matched agents but could generate a higher 
social cost related to the unmatched agents if these ones, especially the low type, do not get an 
alternative occupation.  We acknowledge that our measure of welfare, based on the total surplus, 
is purely utilitarian, and a Rawlsian approach would somewhat qualify our conclusions. 
 
7.  CONCLUSION 
We have conducted an experiment based on a model of contracting under asymmetric 
information.  We have shown theoretically that, in this context, various degrees of competition 
on the market affect outcomes and efficiency.   In this environment, efficiency improves in the 
relative number of agents because competition reduces the agents’ informational monopoly 
power.  However, this environment also generates inequality level and is characterized by 
multiple equilibria, which may have important behavioral implications in the field and suggests 
that empirical testing could produce valuable insights 
Our results provide qualitative support for theory.  Our experiment finds that the 
institutional environment in which agents compete against each other is indeed the most efficient 
one.  Our experiment also finds that behavior evolves over time.  People make errors, learn and 
adjust their decisions accordingly in order to increase their payoffs.  In particular, the payoff 
obtained in the previous period, especially related to the ability to separate between types, is a 
driving force of the evolution of principals’ menu offers.  Our results also show that principals 
  39offer more generous menus than predicted, although less frequently in the context of 
competition. 
These results question the interaction between the various degrees of bargaining power 
and social preferences.  In many experimental papers, social preferences are shown to interfere 
with the predictions of standard contract theory.  In our treatment without competition, we also 
observe that principals offer menus of contracts that are more generous than the equilibrium.  
When agents compete, principals tend also to offer more generous contract menus than the 
equilibrium, but this is less the case when they are able to separate the agents by type with the 
equilibrium menus; this calls into question the true generosity of these offers.  In addition, the 
existence of social preferences can hardly change the outcome for the low-type agents:  due to 
the heterogeneity among agents, offering a more generous menu increases the selected agent’s 
expected payoff but also increases the likelihood of the repeated exclusion of the low-type 
agents.   
Finally, the superiority of the institutional environment with a competition among agents 
is shown in terms of total surplus of the matched pairs.  The higher total surplus is achieved by 
making the payoff of the principal higher and lowering those of the agents.  Thus, there is a 
genuine tradeoff between equity and efficiency in this environment, both theoretically and 
empirically.  
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You are about to participate in an experiment on decision-making carried out by researchers from the 
Universitat Pompeu Fabra, the University of California at Santa Barbara and GATE.  During this session, 
you can earn money.  The amount of your earnings depends on your decisions and on the decisions of the 
other participants in this session.  During the session, your earnings will be calculated in points,  
with 100 points = 1 Euro 
During the session, losses are possible.  However, they can be avoided with certainty by your decisions. 
The session consists of 40 independent periods.  Only 4 periods will be chosen at random for actual 
payment, at the end of the session.  The earnings you have made during these 4 periods will be added up 
and converted into Euros.  In addition, you will receive € 4 for participating in the experiment.  Your 
earnings will be paid to you in cash in private to preserve confidentiality. 
Your decisions are anonymous and confidential. 
During this session, there are two categories of participants: 4 participants are proposers and 12 
participants are responders.  The responders can be of two types: A or B.  
The category to which the participant is assigned (proposer or responder) and the type of participant in 
the case the participant is a responder are chosen randomly at the beginning of the session. Each 
responder has an equal initial probability to be of either type A or type B.  Half of all responders will be 
of each type.  
You will be informed of your category and of your type if you are a responder at the beginning of the 
session and you will keep the same category and the same type throughout the session.  If you are a 
responder, no one knows your type. 
Description of each period 
At the beginning of each period, each proposer is randomly matched with 3 responders.  The responders 
may be either type, but the proposer does not know their types when making a proposal.  The identity of 
your co-participants is unknown to you.  The composition of the group changes randomly every period. 
Each period consists of four stages. 
  In the first stage, the proposer makes a selection from one of 6 possible “offers” {1,2,3,4,5 or 6} 
by checking a box on his screen. 
  In the second stage, the three responders are informed of this offer.  Each can then choose one 
either option X or option Y or “rejection” by checking the corresponding box on his screen.  
  In the third stage, the proposer is informed of the choices of the three responders.  If more than 
one responder has accepted the proposer’s offer, the proposer will select one of the responders 
among those who accepted his offer. He can accept at most one responder.  The responders are 
not informed about the choices made by the other responders. The responders who have not been 
selected receive a payoff of 125 points. 
  In the fourth stage, each person is informed of his own payoff in that period. 
 
How are payoffs calculated? 
                                                 
19 The instructions for the other treatments are available upon request. 
  44The payoffs depend on the offer made by the proposer, on the responders’ decisions and on the choice 
made by the proposer among the responders. When a proposer chooses a responder, his payoff depends 
only on his offer and on the option chosen by this responder; the responders who have not been selected 
do not provide him with any additional payoff.  
 
Please refer to the Table provided.  This Table displays the 6 possible offers and their associated payoffs. 
Corresponding to each offer, you can see 3 rows: 
-  The first row, in blue, indicates the payoffs of the proposer.  
-  The second row, in yellow, indicates the responder’s payoffs if his type is A. 
-  The third row, in pink, indicates the responder’s payoffs if his type is B. 
The 3 columns represent the decisions made by the responder: 
-  The column (1) corresponds to the choice of option X if the responder accepts the offer  
-  The column (2) corresponds to the choice of option Y if the responder accepts the offer  
-  The column (3) corresponds to the case of the responder rejects the offer. 
 
At the intersection of a row and a column, you can read the payoffs associated with an offer and a choice 
as a function of the role of proposer or responder. 
  
Here are some examples. 
Example 1. The proposer has chosen the offer 1.  One responder of type B has accepted this offer and 
chosen option Y.  The two other responders have rejected this offer.  In this case, the proposer will 
receive 355 points; the responder who has accepted the offer will receive 135 points; the responders who 
have rejected the offer will receive 125 points. 
Example 2. The proposer has chosen the offer 3.  One responder of type A and one responder of type B 
have accepted this offer and chosen option Y; the other responder of type A has also accepted the offer 
and chosen option X.  The proposer chooses the responder who chose option X.  The proposer will 
receive 550 points; the responder who has been chosen will receive 210 points; the responders who have 
not been chosen will receive 125 points. 
Example 3. If the proposer has chosen the offer 6 and if no responder has accepted his offer, both the 
proposer and the responders receive 125 points. 
 
To sum up, in each period, if you are a proposer, you choose an offer from among the six feasible options 
and you choose between the responders who have accepted your offer; you cannot accept more than one 
responder.  If you are a responder, you choose either option X or option Y or you reject the offer.  Your 
payoffs for the current period are then computed. 
 
At the end of a period, a new period starts automatically.  Each period is independent.  
 
----------------- 
If you have any question regarding these instructions, please raise your hand.  Your questions will be 
immediately answered in private.  Throughout the entire session, direct communication between 
participants is strictly forbidden.  
  45APPENDIX B - Nonparametric tests 
Our nonparametric tests are Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank-sum tests, conducted with 
both session-level and individual-level data.  In a strict sense each session consists of only one 
independent observation, since there is considerable interaction between parties over the course 
of each session.  Table A presents a summary of principal and agent choices in each of our 
sessions. 
 
Table A: Session-level data 
B treatment  EA treatment   EP treatment  Variables 
S1  S2  S3  S4  S5  S6  S7  S8  S9 
Average  offer  3.41 3.50 2.53 2.51 2.07 3.04 5.08 5.11 5.05 
Rejection rates (M 1, 2 & 3)  0.23  0.38  0.10  0.08  0.13  0.04  -  -  - 
High agent-option X (M 1& 2)  0.00  0.00  0.52  0.50  0.82  0.56  -  -  - 
High agent-option X (M 3)  0.75  0.26  0.87  0.96  1.00  0.96  -  -  - 
% high type (actual contracts)  0.56  0.57  0.74  0.84  0.84  0.83  0.50  0.50  0.50 
 
The average contract menu offered is lowest in the four EA sessions and highest in the 
three EP sessions.  Rank-sum tests find Z = 2.12 and p = 0.03 for the comparison between EA 
and EP, Z = 1.85 and p = 0.06 for the comparison between EA and B, and Z =1.73 and p = 0.08 
for the comparison between B and EP.  The likelihood that EA < B < EP (for average menu 
offered) is only p = 0.004.  Principals offer significantly different contract menus in each 
treatment. 
We also see that rejection rates of the less generous menus (1-3) are substantially higher 
in both B sessions than in any of the four EA sessions, yielding Z = 1.85 and p = 0.06.
20  In 
addition, high agents in the B treatment are less likely to choose option X in response to menus 1 
and 2 than are high agents in the EA treatment (insufficient observations in the EP treatment); 
recall that the myopic profit-maximizing choice in the EA treatment is Y.  As the rate is lower in 
both B sessions than in any of the four EA sessions; this gives Z = 1.88 and p = 0.06.  The rate of 
option X being chosen by the high agent is lower in both B sessions than in any of the four EA 
sessions, with Z = 1.85 and p = 0.06.  This is consistent with the fact that the offer of menu 3 is 
already more ‘generous’ than the equilibrium in the EA treatment.  Finally, the proportion of 
high agents in the actual contracts is higher in the EA sessions than in the B sessions (Z = 1.85 
and p = 0.06) and it is smaller than a random draw of 0.875 (p = 0.04, t-test).   This proportion is 
also higher in the B than in the EP sessions (p = 0.08) and it is larger than a random draw of 0.50 
(p = 0.01, t-test). 
Since we have only a few sessions in each treatment, we supplement these tests by 
collapsing the 40 choices of each participant to one number; while this approach ignores the 
interaction between parties, we feel it is nevertheless informative.  These results confirm the 
                                                 
20 We choose menus 1-3 as there are few rejections of menus 4-6 and these all occurred in the B treatment. 
  46patterns above, but with a higher degree of statistical significance.  The Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney tests find that there are significant differences in the average menu offered between 
each pair of treatments (Z  = 3.99, 5.71, and 5.69 for EA vs. B,  EA vs. EP, and B vs. EP, 
respectively; all of these test statistics give p < 0.001).  The test also indicates that the rejection 
rates of menus 1-3 are significantly higher in the B treatment than in the EA treatment (Z = 2.60, 
p = 0.01). Finally, the test confirms that the proportion of high agents in the actual contracts is 
larger in the EA than in the B treatment (Z = 4.36, p < 0.001) but this test fails when comparing 
the B and EP treatments (Z = 1.56, p = 0.11). 
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